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There are broad similarities between conceptions of “good ad-
ministration” in the United States and in the European Union
(“E.U.”).  These similarities are combined with considerable varia-
tions, both in the understanding of the scope of these “rights” or “ex-
pectations” and the institutional context within which they are
articulated and enforced.  On the European side of the Atlantic, arti-
cle 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights—incorporated as article
II-101 of the (as yet unratified) Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe—provides a similar definition of the “Right to good
administration”:
1. Every person has the right to have his or her affairs han-
dled impartially, fairly and within a reasonable time by the
institutions and bodies of the Union.
2. This right includes:
— the right of every person to be heard, before any individ-
ual measure which would affect him or her adversely is
taken;
— the right of every person to have access to his or her file,
while respecting the legitimate interests of confidentiality
and of professional and business secrecy;
— the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its
decisions.
3. Every person has the right to have the Community make
good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants
in the performance of their duties, in accordance with the
general principles common to the laws of the Member States.
4. Every person may write to the institutions of the Union in
one of the languages of the Treaties and must have an answer
in the same language.1
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1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 41, Dec. 7, 2000, 2000 O.J.
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These principles of good administration are surely familiar to
American lawyers as well.  The right to be heard and to have decisions
on one’s interests made fairly and impartially are embodied in the
Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution and in a wide range of
statutes, including the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).2  The
right of access to government information is guaranteed by the Free-
dom of Information Act.3  In addition, the rights to petition adminis-
trative institutions, to receive responses to those petitions, and to
obtain reasons for administrative decisions are guaranteed both by the
APA4 and numerous judicial determinations.  The right to compensa-
tion for damage caused by administrative officials is defined largely by
American common law, whereas the government’s liability for dam-
ages is structured by statutes such as the Tucker Act5 and the Federal
Tort Claims Act.6
Nevertheless, when pursuing any of these principles in more de-
tail, one would find some significant differences in U.S. and E.U. prac-
tices.  Although richly embellished by judicial interpretations,
American lawyers can generally point to a text: the U.S. Constitution,
the APA, or some more specific statute as the source of a particular
right to good administration.  In the European Union, the treaty artic-
ulating a number of these rights remains to be ratified, and that ratifi-
cation effort may stall indefinitely.7  “Good administration” is, up to
now, often a function of judicial decisions8 and agency codes of behav-
ior.  Access to information in the Freedom of Information Act is a
(C 364) 1, 18, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf; see Treaty Es-
tablishing a Constitution for Europe art. II-101, Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1, 50, available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML.
2 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
3 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
4 See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e).
5 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000).
6 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674, 2680.
7 See Matthew Tempest, Q&A: The EU Constitution, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED (London),
June 18, 2007, http://politics.guardian.co.uk/eu/story/0,,2105890,00.html.
8 Klara Kanska suggests that the rights included in article 41 of the Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights and article II-101 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe are a somewhat
incomplete compilation of the separate rights developed by the Court of Justice and the courts of
the member states.  Klara Kanska, Towards Administrative Human Rights in the EU: The Impact
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 10 EUR. L.J. 296, 299–305 (2004); see also Lord Millet, The
Right to Good Administration in European Union Law, 47 PUB. L. 309, 313 (2002) (dating this
process of development to Joined Cases 7/56 & 3/57-7/57, Algera v. Common Assembly, 1957
E.C.R. 39).
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general right to most government documents,9 not, as in the European
Union, just those relating to a person seeking access to his or her own
file.10  Moreover, the exceptions to the Freedom of Information Act
are spelled out in great detail and backed by an expedited enforce-
ment procedure.  On the other hand, a right to damages for official
misconduct, error, or nonfeasance begins in the United States from a
premise of governmental immunity.  Compensation is permitted only
to the extent that statutes specifically waive the government’s immu-
nity from suit.11
Exploring the many similarities and differences in the “right to
good administration” in the European Union and the United States is
the task of many books, not the task of one essay.  This Article fo-
cuses, therefore, on the right to reasons and the practice of adminis-
trative reason giving.  This is a common and important feature of both
E.U. and U.S. administrative law and, I will argue, a somewhat under-
theorized one.  This Article therefore seeks to explain why reason giv-
ing is so prominent a part of both administrative systems, how it func-
tions juridically, and, most crucially, what the reasons are for
demanding reasons or for providing a “right” to reasoned administra-
tion.  In the course of that exploration, I hope to show that the rea-
sons most commonly advanced for reason giving in both the E.U. and
the U.S. systems tend to ignore reason giving’s most fundamental
function—the creation of authentic democratic governance.
I. Reason Giving as a Social Practice
In a recent book, Charles Tilly sets out to explain the reason for
reasons.12  According to Tilly’s view, which, as he explains, has a long
intellectual history, reason giving is an entirely relational enterprise.13
Reasons are given to negotiate, establish, repair, affirm, or deny rela-
tionships.14  Moreover, the type of relationship (that exists or that is
claimed to exist) determines the type of reasons that are appropriate
and, therefore, potentially acceptable or persuasive.15  Tilly demon-
strates with many arresting examples how various reasons work rela-
tionally, that is, to justify our behavior depending upon the type of
9 See 5 U.S.C. § 552.
10 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. II-101(2)(b).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).
12 CHARLES TILLY, WHY? ix (2006).
13 See id. at x, 14–15.
14 See id. at 19–20.
15 See id. at 15.
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relationship involved and whether our purpose is to establish, affirm,
negotiate, or repair relations with others.16
This relational account is perfectly understandable, indeed illumi-
nating, when placed in the context of the relations of administrative
officials with those to whom they might give reasons.  When carrying
out their administrative tasks, officials have relationships of at least
three types: relations with other officials, the general public affected
by administrative actions or policies, and particular individuals or
firms who are the specific addressees of administrative orders or the
direct or personal beneficiaries of administrative decisions.
Consider first an administrator’s relationship with other officials.
Those would include relationships with hierarchical superiors in the
administration, political controllers (legislatures, parliaments, minis-
ters, or elected chief executives), legal controllers (courts), and coor-
dinate officials (officials at essentially the same level in the same or
other agencies).  With respect to the first three of these relationships,
administrators have a particular sort of reason to offer reasons if re-
quested.  Hierarchical superiors, political controllers, and the judiciary
have the power to impose unpleasant consequences on administrators
who fail to explain themselves successfully.  And coordinate officials
are unlikely to provide cooperation (or withhold complaint) unless
provided with an acceptable explanation of why they should do so.  To
be sure, the types of reasons one official gives to another are likely to
vary.  Although “my immediate supervisor told me to do so” may be
sufficient for the head of the bureau, it is not likely to satisfy a parlia-
mentary investigating committee, an official in a coordinate agency or
coordinate national administration, or a court reviewing the legality of
official action.  Yet, in each case, officials have strong prudential rea-
sons to give reasons.  They need to supply justifications, or at least
excuses, to avoid or mitigate unpleasant consequences, or to solicit
cooperation or acceptance.
For present purposes, we might describe these official-to-official
reason giving relationships as “bottom-up” (to bureaucratic, political,
or legal controllers) and “side-to-side” (to coordinate officials).  They
proceed according to the power relationships established by law and
custom among official actors.  They facilitate control, accountability,
and coordination amongst institutions that have been placed in certain
relationships to each other in what we might loosely call the constitu-
16 See generally TILLY, supra note 12 (explaining how reasons work in four categories: 
conventions, stories, codes, and technical accounts).
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tional arrangements of a particular polity, whether national or
supranational.
The power relations between officials and the general public, or
officials and particular individuals or firms, are rather different.  Act-
ing within their jurisdiction or authority, administrative officials exer-
cise consequential legal power.  Private parties are accountable to or
dependent upon them, not the other way around.  The relationship is
“top-down.”  Why should officials give reasons to nonofficials rather
than simply issuing edicts or orders?  To some degree, the answer
might parallel that suggested for coordinate officials.  Explanations
may assist officials in obtaining public cooperation and in avoiding
complaints or lawsuits, which have their own unpleasantness even if
the officials are ultimately found to be blameless.  And the degree to
which the officials feel the need to solicit cooperation or avoid com-
plaint may determine the specificity and style of their explanation.
Or, alternatively, political or legal controllers might demand that rea-
sons be given to otherwise powerless citizens as a way of facilitating
bottom-up monitoring or oversight.  What better way for these con-
trollers to assure that officials accountable to them are behaving prop-
erly than to require transparency in decisionmaking with respect to
private parties who have an interest in calling official error or malfea-
sance to account?17
In some sense, the simple difference between bottom-up, side-to-
side, and top-down relations may explain why it is thought necessary
to provide a right to reasons in the latter case.  A right to reasons
facilitates hierarchical, legal, and political accountability.  As we shall
see, most of the reasons for reason giving articulated by courts or legal
commentators are precisely of this consequentialist sort.  They explain
the reasons for reasons in terms of maintaining appropriate institu-
tional relationships in the legal order, or as a means of policing official
behavior.  But this observation gets somewhat ahead of the story.
Before turning to what courts and commentators say about reasons
within the legal orders of the United States and the European Union,
we should consider a quite different explanation for reason giving.
17 Indeed, some literature on positive political theory in the United States suggests that
this monitoring feature of private rights is the major explanation for procedural safeguards such
as the APA. See Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 244–46 (1987); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Struc-
ture and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of
Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 442 (1989).
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This second account denies that reason giving can be fully under-
stood in consequentialist terms.  A good example is a recent essay by
John Gardner on the concept of responsibility.18  Gardner does not
deny that reason giving is often relational or that much of it is de-
signed to justify or excuse behavior in contexts in which we might an-
ticipate unpleasant consequences.19  But, on Gardner’s view, this
relational account does not go very deep into the reasons for reason
giving.20  He contrasts this “Hobbesian” consequentialist view with
what he styles as an “Aristotelian” one.21  On this account, to be a
rational being is to have reasons for our actions; without reasons for
our actions, our lives make no sense to us.22  According to Gardner’s
account, “[w]e cannot but want there to have been adequate reasons
why we did (or thought or felt) what we did (or thought or felt).”23
The implication for Gardner is that although we might give differ-
ing reasons depending upon social contexts and social relations, there
is certainly no necessity that we do so.24  Hence, the relational account
is at best incomplete.  Moreover, to make rational sense of our lives,
this tailoring of reasons to particular relationships may have unhappy
consequences.25  It makes us appear incoherent to ourselves.  Indeed,
tailoring our reasons differently for different purposes, particularly if
we are thinking of justifications or excuses, tends to deny that we had
some reason that explains ourselves to ourselves.  And to deny that is
to deny, in some sense, that we are responsible actors with rational life
plans.  In carrying out this Aristotelian project, we want to give a good
account of ourselves.  It is that sort of accounting or reason giving that
affirms our own rationality and our status as responsible moral agents.
But what does this account of reason giving have to do with rea-
soned administration or the right to reasons as a part of a right to
“good administration”?  Just this: to be subject to administrative au-
thority that is unreasoned is to be treated as a mere object of the law
or political power, not a subject with independent rational capacities.
Unreasoned coercion denies our moral agency and our political stand-
18 John Gardner, The Mark of Responsibility (With a Postscript on Accountability), in PUB-
LIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 220, 221–22 (Michael W. Dowdle
ed., 2006).
19 See id.
20 Id. at 221.
21 Id. at 221–22.
22 Id. at 221.
23 Id.
24 See id. at 228–29.
25 See id. at 229–30.
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ing as citizens entitled to respect as ends in ourselves, not as mere
means in the effectuation of state purposes.  This sort of explanation
begins to illuminate why we might think of reasoned administrations
as an individual right, indeed a fundamental individual right, not just
as a contingent feature of accountability regimes.
I will come back to this reason for reason giving toward the end
of this Essay, but first, we should take a look at the reasons for rea-
sons that are common in the jurisprudence and literature of adminis-
trative law in the United States and European Union.  As we shall see,
the common reasons generally track Tilly’s relational, consequentialist
description with little attention to Gardner’s more fundamental expla-
nation.26  In so doing, American and European administrative law
tend to treat the right to reasons as a contingent right, one that is
parasitic on other substantive or procedural rights or institutional ar-
rangements.  I will argue that this approach fails to explain not only
why reason giving is ubiquitous as a human practice, but why reason
receiving should be instantiated as an important and independent
human right.  I shall argue further that recognizing this more funda-
mental grounding for reason giving has important implications for the
ongoing project of democratic governance in unavoidably administra-
tive states.
II. Reasons and Law
A. Reasons in American Administrative Law
The right to reasons in American administrative law is conven-
tionally understood as parasitic on other rights or on the necessities of
effective judicial review.  In the world of American administrative
law, rights to hearings and reasons are sharply divided between cases
involving individual claims of right and situations in which administra-
tive action takes place by general rule or regulation.
Individual hearing rights in American administrative law are
grounded in either the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution
or in particular statutes as supplemented by the APA.  It has been
long established that the Constitution makes no independent require-
ment for hearings, including reason giving, where general rules or reg-
ulations are at issue.27  Indeed, as a constitutional matter, not all
26 See TILLY, supra note 12, at 14–15. See generally Gardner, supra note 18. 
27 Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (holding that a small group of
plaintiffs in a taxation proceeding were denied due process of law when a local board adjusted
their tax liabilities on individualized grounds but without providing them with a hearing), with
Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (finding that individu-
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administrative decisions in individual cases are protected by hearing
rights or rights to reasons.  Those protections are limited to actions
affecting individual interests that fall within the Supreme Court’s
evolving definition of “life, liberty, and property” under the Due Pro-
cess Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.28  Of course,
Congress may, and does, provide for hearings that would not be de-
manded by the Constitution.  When a statute requires that actions be
taken only on the basis of a record made at a hearing, the APA pro-
vides a standard set of formal hearing requirements.29  Whether the
hearing is required by the Constitution or by a statute supplemented
by the APA, the giving of reasons is one of the standard features of
the hearing right itself.
In a celebrated article,30 Judge Henry Friendly identified eleven
features that might be regarded as essential to a fair administrative
hearing: (1) an unbiased tribunal; (2) notice of the proposed action
and the grounds asserted for it; (3) an opportunity to present reasons
why proposed action should not be taken; (4) the right to call wit-
nesses; (5) the right to know the evidence against oneself; (6) the right
to have a decision based exclusively on the evidence presented; (7) the
right to counsel; (8) the making of a record; (9) the availability of a
statement of reasons for the decision; (10) public attendance; and (11)
judicial review of the final decision.31
All of these legal protections are meant to ensure that when sig-
nificant individual interests are at stake, the government acts only on
the basis of reliable evidence and within its proper authority.  In one
of the most famous cases on due process of law in the United States,
Goldberg v. Kelly,32 the Supreme Court explained the requirement of
reason giving in wholly instrumental terms.33  In two brief sentences,
the Court said:
Finally, the decisionmaker’s conclusion as to a recipi-
ent’s eligibility must rest solely on the legal rules and evi-
dence adduced at the hearing.  To demonstrate compliance
with this elementary requirement, the decision maker should
als have no constitutional right entitling them to a hearing before a local taxing commission
when changes in their tax liabilities result from a general increase in taxable property rates).
28 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972); Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972).
29 5 U.S.C. § 554 (2000).
30 Henry Friendly, “Some Kind of Hearing,” 123 U. PA. L. Rev. 1267 (1975).
31 Id. at 1279–95.
32 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
33 Id. at 271.
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state the reasons for his determination and indicate the evi-
dence he relied on, though his statement need not amount to
a full opinion or even formal findings of fact and conclusions
of law.34
In short, reason giving is meant to ensure that the hearing itself is not
a charade.  Reasons must be linked to the legal rules and evidence
that were a part of the hearing record.  Reasons help to ensure that
the individual’s right to contest, present evidence, make legal argu-
ments, and so on, have been respected in making a final judgment on
the case.
Moreover, these hearing rights are themselves viewed essentially
in instrumentalist terms.  The leading case on due process in the
United States, Mathews v. Eldridge,35 sets forth a “balancing” formula
for determining whether particular procedures are required as a part
of a hearing process.36  According to the Eldridge Court:
[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification of the spe-
cific dictates of due process generally requires consideration
of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the risk of an errone-
ous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and admin-
istrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirements would entail.37
In short, due process requirements of procedural protection, in-
cluding the requirement of reason giving, are part of a social welfare
calculation that weighs and balances the importance of the individ-
ual’s substantive claim, and the likely contribution of any particular
procedural requirement to the accurate determination of that claim
against the government’s interest in effectiveness and efficiency.  The
right to reasons where individual interests are concerned is therefore
dependent upon: (1) the legal status of that interest (that is, whether it
qualifies as a substantive right protected by the Constitution, statute,
or common law); and (2) the contribution that the provision of proce-
dural protections, including a right to reasons for the decision, will
34 Id. (citations omitted).
35 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
36 Id. at 334–35.
37 Id. (citation omitted).
108 The George Washington Law Review [Vol. 76:99
make to an accurate determination of that claim of right.  Or so it
would seem.
One can find in American jurisprudence, however, a somewhat
more general ground for reason giving that is not parasitic on individ-
ual rights to a hearing.  In any case subject to the APA,38 which covers
the vast majority of federal administrative decisions having legal ef-
fect, a reviewing court is instructed to reverse the administrative de-
termination where the actual choice made was “arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”39  To
make that finding, or reject it, the reviewing court must know the
agency’s basis for its decision: as the Supreme Court put it in yet an-
other iconic case, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,40
“[t]o make this finding the court must consider whether the decision
was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether
there has been a clear error of judgment.”41  The problem in the Over-
ton Park case was that the Secretary of Transportation, in making a
location decision for an interstate highway, had not provided a con-
temporaneous statement of the reasons for his choice.42  The Supreme
Court recognized that there was no statutory or constitutional require-
ment of contemporaneous reason giving that applied to this sort of
decision.43  Yet the Court declined to approve a review based upon
affidavits from the Secretary and other administrative officials con-
cerning the reasons for their decision.44  In the Court’s terms, “[t]hese
affidavits were merely ‘post hoc’ rationalizations, which have tradi-
tionally been found to be an inadequate basis for review.”45
Under these circumstances, the Court felt it necessary to remand
the case to the district court for a plenary inquiry into the Secretary’s
decision, including, if necessary, calling the Secretary and other offi-
cials to testify concerning their rationale.46  The Court closed with this
suggestion:
The District Court is not, however, required to make
such an inquiry.  It may be that the Secretary can prepare
formal findings . . . that will provide an adequate explanation
38 See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2000).
39 Id. § 706(2)(A).
40 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
41 Id. at 416.
42 Id. at 408.
43 Id. at 409
44 Id. at 419.
45 Id. (citation omitted).
46 See id. at 420.
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for his action.  Such an explanation will, to some extent, be a
“post hoc rationalization” and thus must be viewed critically.
If the District Court decides that additional explanation is
necessary, that court should consider which method will
prove the most expeditious so that full review may be had as
soon as possible.47
On this view of reason giving, reasons are necessary whenever an
administrative decision is subject to judicial review.  Moreover, be-
cause judicial review is meant to determine the real reasons for the
action, it should proceed, wherever possible, on the basis of contem-
poraneous reasons explaining both the factual and legal bases for the
administrative determination.  And, from a practical standpoint, any
administrator who does not want to spend his or her time in court
testifying about past decisions would be well advised to provide a con-
temporaneous statement of reasons when a decision is made.  For, if
that is done, another well known decision, United States v. Morgan,48
provides that reviewing courts should make no further inquiry into the
mental processes of administrative decisionmakers (absent some spe-
cial showing of corruption or bad faith).49
American jurisprudence on the making of general rules has elab-
orated on this notion of administrative reason giving as a requirement
in aid of judicial review.  Section 553 of the APA contains the rela-
tively innocuous requirement that, when making rules or regulations
having binding effect on private parties, the agency must provide no-
tice of its proposal, an opportunity for affected parties to comment,
and “a concise general statement of their basis and purpose” in the
order issuing the rule or regulation.50
This language lay relatively dormant in the APA until the late
1960s and early 1970s when Congress passed a series of health and
safety statutes concerning motor vehicle safety, occupational safety
and health, and environmental protection that were themselves almost
empty of substantive legal requirements.51  These new statutes gave
federal administrators extremely broad discretion to develop general
47 Id. at 420–21.
48 United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941).
49 See id. at 422.
50 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c) (2000).
51 See, e.g., National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80
Stat. 718 (recodified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30170 (2000)); Occupational Safety and Health Act
of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2000));
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2000)).
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regulations governing virtually every industry and occupation in the
United States.  Resistance to this relatively novel exercise of federal
power was to be expected, and litigation about these rulemaking activ-
ities proceeded apace.  In one of the first cases to come before the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the U.S. court that
reviews much federal administrative rulemaking activity, Judge Mc-
Gowan cautioned against an “overly literal reading” of the APA’s re-
quirement of a “concise general statement”:
These adjectives must be accommodated to the realities of
judicial scrutiny, which do not contemplate that the court it-
self will, by a laborious examination of the record, formulate
in the first instance the significant issues faced by the agency
and articulate the rationale of their resolution.  We do not
expect the agency to discuss every item of fact or opinion
included in the submissions made to it in informal rule mak-
ing.  We do expect that, if the judicial review which Congress
has thought it important to provide is to be meaningful, the
“concise general statement of . . . basis and purpose” man-
dated by [the APA] will enable us to see what major issues of
policy were ventilated by the informal proceedings and why
the agency reacted to them as it did.52
Since the Automotive Parts decision, a focus on an agency’s rea-
sons for a regulation has become the hallmark of judicial review of
rulemaking activity under the APA.  Courts routinely return decisions
to administrative agencies on the ground that the rationale provided is
inadequate to explain some critical fact or issue that the agency was
required to consider.53  Indeed, one of the Supreme Court’s most fa-
mous cases supporting a so-called “hard look” standard of judicial re-
view, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., rejects the rescission of a rule by the Na-
tional Highway Traffic Safety Administration because of the agency’s
failure to consider amending its rule rather than rescinding it.54  In the
Court’s words, “[n]ot having discussed the possibility, the agency sub-
mitted no reasons at all.”55  Lack of adequate discussion alone was
sufficient for a finding that the agency’s determination was arbitrary
under the APA.56
52 Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
53 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
54 See id. at 51.
55 Id. at 50.
56 See id. at 50–51.
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The requirement that agencies give understandable and relatively
complete reasons for rulemaking as well as for decisions in individual
hearings does more than facilitate judicial review.  It also increases the
power of participants in informal rulemaking processes to force agen-
cies to consider problems and issues that they raise by submitting
comments concerning the agency’s proposals.  Hence, a demand for
reason giving is also in some practical sense a demand for responsive-
ness to the submissions of affected parties.  It therefore reinforces
their rights of participation as provided by the APA.  The judicial de-
mand for reasons to facilitate judicial review reinforces participatory
rights concerning general regulations in the same fashion that reason
giving protects individualized hearing rights concerning particularized
decisions.
Reason giving as a requirement of administrative law in the
United States is thus a common—but a contingent—enterprise.  With
respect to individual cases, reason giving is parasitic on the require-
ment of a hearing, and the entitlement to a hearing is itself a function
of a right to defend some particular substantive legal entitlement.
With respect to general regulations or rulemaking, reason giving is de-
manded as a facilitator of judicial review.  It is also a protector of judi-
cial review in a constitutional system dedicated to separation of
powers.  It allows judicial review of policy choices for reasonableness,
a practice made problematic by the Supreme Court’s aggressive use of
“substantive due process” to strike down New Deal legislation in the
1930s, while insulating the judiciary from the charge that it is inappro-
priately second-guessing the political branches of government.  The
judicial demand for reasons has become a legitimate procedural ver-
sion of an otherwise illegitimate substantive demand for reasonable-
ness, as judicially determined.
The proceduralization of rationality—the conversion of the de-
mand for nonarbitrariness into a demand for understandable reason
giving—rephrases the question of whether the agency’s action is rea-
sonable in some substantive sense as a demand that the agency
demonstrate a reasoning process.  The demand for reasons and yet
more reasons, at least rhetorically, keeps the court within its appropri-
ate domain.  The agency may make policy choices, so long as it ex-
plains how its exercise of discretion is connected to its statutory
authority and to the technical facts that have been developed through
the rulemaking proceeding.  That this “restrained” judicial posture
may in fact disable or seriously impede regulatory activity is merely an
ironic, unintended consequence of the maintenance of the American
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understanding of the court’s role within its constitutional, legal
structure.57
B. Reason Giving in the Law of the European Union
The obligation of the administration to give reasons for its deci-
sions, as set out in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and
incorporated into the proposed European Constitution, has been elab-
orated in the European Code of Good Administrative Behavior
(“ECGAB”).58  The ECGAB supplements and explains the obliga-
tions set out in the Charter.59  According to article 18 of the ECGAB,
the requirement of reason giving applies to decisions “which may ad-
versely affect the rights or interests of a private person.”60  In addition,
decisions should not be based on “brief or vague grounds or which do
not contain individual reasoning”;61 this requirement suggests that the
right to receive reasons is contemplated for circumstances described in
the preceding Parts, involving individualized adjudication, rather than
the enunciation of general rules or regulations.  Nevertheless, article
253 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (“EC
Treaty”) demands the following:
Regulations, directives and decisions adopted jointly by
the European Parliament and the Council, and such acts
adopted by the Council or the Commission, shall state the
reasons on which they are based and shall refer to any pro-
posals or opinions which were required to be obtained pursu-
ant to this Treaty.62
As in the United States, the case law and scholarly writing sug-
gest almost exclusively instrumental grounds for these reason giving
requirements: the necessity to permit judicial monitoring of institu-
tional decisionmaking and the need to facilitate the capacities of indi-
viduals to contest official determinations that are contrary to their
interests.63  Indeed, two decades ago, the European Court of Justice
57 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of
Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 305 (1987).
58 European Ombudsman, The European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, at 16
(Jan. 5, 2005), available at http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/code/pdf/en/code2005_en.pdf.
59 Id. at 7.
60 Id. at 16.
61 Id.
62 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 26, 2001, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 135
[hereinafter EC Treaty].
63 Klara Kanska asserts:
[A]ccording to the case law of the Courts, the duty to state reasons has two objec-
tives: it is necessary in order to ensure that the individual has an opportunity to
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(“ECJ”) bundled these two instrumental grounds together.  In Union
Nationale Des Entraineurs et Cadres Techniques Professionneles du
Football (UNECTEF) v. Heylens,64 the Court held:
Effective judicial review, which must be able to cover
the legality of the reasons for the contested decision, presup-
poses in general that the court to which the matter referred
may require the competent authority to notify its reasons.
But where, as in this case, it is more particularly a question
of securing the effective protection of a fundamental right
[the right of free movement] conferred by the Treaty on
Community workers, the latter must also be able to defend
that right under the best possible conditions and have the
possibility of deciding, with full knowledge of the relevant
facts, whether there is any point in their applying to the
courts.  Consequently, in such circumstances the competent
national authority is under a duty to inform them of the rea-
sons on which its refusal is based, either in the decisions itself
or in a subsequent communication made at their request.65
In many ways, this approach directly parallels what we might call the
“double instrumentalism” of the American due process jurisprudence.
A right of defense (“hearing” in the U.S. vernacular) is essential
where fundamental rights are at stake, and reasoned decisionmaking
is critical to an effective right of defense.
In a recent article, Lord Millet explains the genesis of the require-
ment of reason giving in E.U. law as derivative from or inspired by
member states’ administrative laws.66  In France, for example, admin-
istrators generally have wide discretion in making administrative deci-
sions, they are held to a duty of care and reasonableness in their
decisionmaking, which according to Millet “would be unenforceable
in the absence of . . . [an additional] duty to give reasons.”67  Millet
thus emphasizes the contribution of reason giving to judicial review
consider whether it is feasible to challenge a given measure, and it serves to ensure
that the Court can exercise its powers to review the legality of the measure.
Kanska, supra note 8, at 320 (footnotes omitted).  Bo Vesterdorf echoes this view: “The state- 
ment of reasons . . . must provide information to all persons interested in the measure and
ultimately the reasoning must be sufficient to allow the Community Courts to ascertain whether
or not the Community measure has been adopted ultra vires.”  Bo Vesterdorf, Transparency—
Not Just a Vogue Word, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 902, 904 (1999).
64 Case 222/86, Union Nationale des Entraı̂neurs et Cadres Techniques Professionnels du
Football (UNECTEF) v. Heylens, 1987 E.C.R. 4097.
65 Id. at 4117.
66 Millet, supra note 8, at 311. 
67 See Millet, supra note 8, at 314. 
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for reasonableness.68  But a requirement of reasoned administration is
common to the administrative systems of many member states.69  And
other authors also emphasize its contribution to the right of defense
and to transparency.70  Because reason giving contributes to the gen-
eral transparency of official decisionmaking, it also to that degree fa-
cilitates oversight and accountability to political actors and the general
public, not just to courts and litigants.
Although it is not possible here to make a detailed comparison
between the jurisprudence of U.S. and E.U. courts (the ECJ and the
Court of First Instance) concerning the demands of reason giving, the
cases reveal many similarities.71  As in the United States, reasons need
not cover every detail of the contested proceeding but must be suffi-
cient to show how the major issues of fact and law were resolved.72
68 See id.
69 Dr. Juli Ponce provides the following examples:
The 1947 Italian Constitution establishes that Italian agencies must be organ-
ized so as to achieve administrative impartiality and buon andamento.  The last
words have been considered by many Italian scholars to be a duty of good adminis-
tration (buona amministrazione). . . .
The current Spanish Constitution of 1978 is especially interesting.  It provides
in Articles 31 and 103 that public administration must act with objectivity and im-
partiality, in accordance with the principles of effective action, efficiency, economy
and coordination; it also establishes a prohibition of arbitrariness.
See Juli Ponce, Good Administration and Administrative Procedures, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 551, 556 (2005) (footnotes omitted).  Similar provisions can be found in other countries.
70 For example, Bo Vesterdorf states:
Inadequate reasoning means insufficient transparency, because the conse-
quence is, firstly, that the parties affected by the measure are unable to determine
whether the measure is issued on a sound legal basis or whether it could be chal-
lenged before the courts and, secondly, that the courts are unable to examine
whether the arguments on a given point are well-founded.
Vesterdorf, supra note 63, at 906 (emphasis added); see also Kanska, supra note 8, at 320 (assert- 
ing that “motivation of decisions promotes transparency of administrative actions”).
71 A detailed comparison of U.S. and E.U. jurisprudence up through 1992 can be found at
Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179, reprinted in MAR-
TIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS AND JUDICIALIZATION 228, 228–57
(2002).
72 The ECJ does not require European institutions to discuss every item of law or fact
“which may have been dealt with during the administrative proceedings”; however, “the reasons
on which a decision adversely affecting a person is based must allow the Court to exercise its
power of review as to the legality of the decision.”  Joined Cases 43 & 63/82, VBVB & VBBB v.
Comm’n, 1984 E.C.R. 19, 58–59, 1 C.M.L.R. 27, 81 (1985); see Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche
Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3500, 1 C.M.L.R. 282, 319 (1985), cited
in Julian M. Joshua, The Right to Be Heard in EEC Competition Procedures, 15 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 16, 34 (1991); see also Francesca Bignami, Creating European Rights: National Values and
Supranational Interests, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 241, 345 (2005) (“[K]nowing the grounds for a
Commission decision is one thing, obtaining a reply on every objection of fact, policy, and law is
another thing.  The European Courts require only that the statement of reasons be complete
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And like their American colleagues, E.U. judges have tended to
proceduralize rationality, that is, to demand more careful attention to
articulation of the bases for decisions precisely where they are most
within the technical expertise of the administrative authorities.  In this
way the judges can hope to assure conformity to law without invading
the political or policy discretion reserved for administration.73
Hence, it seems fair to say that in both American and European
Union jurisprudence, the right to receive reasons is a sort of derivative
right.  It facilitates individual decisionmaking about whether to con-
test official decisions, protects rights to individualized adjudication,
and promotes the monitoring activities of both political and legal insti-
tutions.  And reasons in both systems have a special value in maintain-
ing vigorous judicial review along the treacherous boundary between
law and policy.  From this perspective, the fundamental value of rea-
son giving is political and legal accountability.  The requirement that
administrative officials give reasons is merely a crucially important
means to that end.
III. A Revisionist Account of Reason Giving
As suggested earlier in this Essay, there is more to reason giving
as an aspect of good administration than is suggested by these instru-
mental accounts.  Indeed, there are clues that this must be true in the
positive law of both the European Union and the United States.  Arti-
enough to enable the parties to determine that the administration acted according to law or that
they must go to court to vindicate their right to a government of laws and not of men.”).
A similar principle appears in E.U. member countries’ practices.  For example, Julian
Joshua cites several British cases in this regard. See R v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, ex
parte Swati, [1986] 1 All E.R. 717 (A.C.); Greater London Council v. Sec’y of State for the Env’t,
[1985] 52 P. & C.R. 158 (A.C.); Norwest Holst Ltd. v. Dep’t of Trade, [1978] 3 All E.R. 280, 296
(A.C.); Elliott v. Southwark London Borough Council, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 499, 508 (A.C.); Metro.
Prop. Holdings Ltd. v. Laufer, [1975] 29 P. & C.R. 172 (Q.B.); Howard v. Borneman, [1974] All
E.R. 862 (A.C.).  In addition, Joshua notes, “Where there is a duty to give reasons, they have to
be intelligible and adequate and deal with the substantial points at issue, but they neither have to
set out the full reasoning process of the decision maker nor record all the evidence given or
submissions made.” Joshua, supra, at 88.
The ECJ supported this principle in Case T-323/99, Industrie Navali Meccaniche Affini SpA
(INMA) & Italia Investimenti SpA (Itainvest) v. Commission, 2002 E.C.R. II-545, finding it un-
necessary to address “all the relevant facts and points of law, since the question whether the
statement of reasons meets the requirements of Article 253 EC must be assessed with regard not
only to its wording but also to its context and all the legal rules governing the matter in ques-
tion.” Id. at II-562 (citing Case C-56/93, Belgium v. Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. I-723).
73 Jürgen Schwarze comments, “The rigorous control of administrative procedure is partic-
ularly intended to counter-balance the far-reaching discretionary powers of the executive.”
Jurgen Schwarze, Judicial Review of European Administrative Procedure, 68 LAW. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 85, 105 (2004).
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cle 253 of the EC Treaty requires reasons for general acts,74 even
though there is no right to judicial review of all general decisions in
the European Union,75 and general acts do not implicate the individ-
ual right to defense.  Similarly, the Supreme Court has interpreted
§ 555(e) of the APA, although in a concurring opinion, to demand
reasons in some cases where no right to hearing or to judicial review
of the decision’s substance is available.76  What more then is at stake
when we demand reasoned administration?
At an abstract level, just this: reason giving is fundamental to the
moral and political legitimacy of the American and European legal
orders.  To be sure, the United States does not suffer quite the same
“democratic deficit” that exists in the European Union.  Therefore, it
might be superficially plausible to argue that the legitimacy of admin-
istrative decisionmaking in the United States is a function of (1) the
electoral accountability of Congress, which creates, structures, funds,
and monitors administrative institutions; and (2) the elected Presi-
dent, who appoints and removes high administrative officials.  On this
view, administrative legitimacy lies in tracing administrative authority
to the mandate of democratically elected institutions.  But this electo-
ral connection is notoriously thin.  Administrators have enormous dis-
cretionary authority, and the exercise of that authority cannot be
74 EC Treaty art. 253, supra note 62, at 135; see Kanska, supra note 8, at 319–20; see also 
Vesterdorf, supra note 63, at 903 (emphasizing former EC Treaty article 190’s—now article 
253’s—requirement to give reasons).  Reason giving in the European context has also been influ-
enced substantially by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, and its reasons
requirement. See David Dyzenhaus & Michael Taggart, Reasoned Decisions and Legal Theory,
in COMMON LAW THEORY 134, 144–45 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., forthcoming Oct. 2007).
Dyzenhaus and Taggart also demonstrate that this influence has pushed the United Kingdom in
the direction of a general requirement of reason giving which was absent from common-law
jurisdictions outside of Australia until late in the Twentieth Century. See id. at 145.
75 See Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Comm’n, 1963 E.C.R. 95, 1964 C.M.L.R. 29, 35–37.  Al-
though the Plaumann decision has been much criticized, the ECJ has reaffirmed its view of
standing to review general orders of the Community. See Cornelia Koch, Commission of the
European Communities v. Jégo-Quéré & Cie SA., Case C-263/02, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 814, 818–19
(2004).  In many cases, a claimant will be able to contest the national measures that implement a
Community regulation in national courts on the ground that the regulation being implemented is
itself illegal. Id. at 816.  Such a case can then produce a referral to the ECJ for a determination
of the legality of the Community norm. Id.  The ECJ, however, has declined to accept an appeal
based on the claim that no national review possibility existed and that the denial of standing
would therefore constitute a denial of justice. See Femke de Lange, Case Note, European Court
of Justice, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, 12 RECIEL 115, 118 (2003).
76 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 841–42 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring).
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explained and legitimated as, in any realistic sense, the direct expres-
sion of the will of the people’s representatives.77
As Max Weber noted long ago, the legitimacy of bureaucratic ac-
tion resides in its promise to exercise power on the basis of knowl-
edge.78  Administrative legitimacy flows primarily from a belief in the
specialized knowledge that administrative decisionmakers can bring to
bear on critical policy choices.  And the only evidence that this spe-
cialized knowledge has in fact been deployed lies in administrators’
explanations or reasons for their actions.  “The statute made me do it”
is sometimes an adequate explanation for a ministerial, i.e., nondiscre-
tionary, administrative act.  But, in a much wider class of cases, the
acceptability or legitimacy of an administrative decision will hinge not
just on the authority or jurisdiction provided by a statute or treaty, but
on the reasons provided for exercising that authority or jurisdiction in
a particular way—either in deciding individual cases or in promulgat-
ing general norms.
So far, so good.  But what makes reason giving legitimating?  The
answer I think relates back to the Aristotelian view of responsibility,
that is, the human capacity both to have and to give reasons for one’s
behavior, which I earlier associated with John Gardner’s account of
responsibility.79  That vision of reasoning and reason giving has partic-
ular moral force in a democratic polity.  For in a democracy, the basic
unit of social value is the individual: persons are viewed from a Kant-
ian perspective as ends in themselves, and governments are democrat-
ically legitimate to the extent that they seek to carryout the collective
desires of the citizenry.  Those desires are, of course, only vaguely and
imperfectly expressed through electoral processes and representative
institutions, which themselves, of necessity, delegate large amounts of
discretionary authority to unelected officials.  But, in a polity where
the individual is the basic unit of social value, the fundamental reason
for accepting law, or any official decisionmaking, as legitimate, is that
77 See Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 728, 782 (2001).
For a more detailed inquiry into the comparative “democracy” of the European Union, the
United States, and Swiss federations, see generally Thomas D. Zweifel, Democratic Deficits in
Comparison: Best (and Worst) Practices in European, US and Swiss Merger Regulation, 41 J.
COMMON MARKET STUD. 541 (2003) (comparing the “accountability and independence of
merger regulation in the European ‘regulatory state’” with those of the United States and
Switzerland).
78 Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 23 (2001) (citing MAX WEBER, 3 ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY 955–1003 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans.,
1968)).
79 See Gardner, supra note 18. 
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reasons can be given why those subject to the law would affirm its
content as serving recognizable collective purposes.
To be sure, there may be much disagreement and dispute about
which public policies are preferable, and which decisions affecting in-
dividual interests are justified.  Nevertheless, a law or decision with
which one disagrees can be recognized as acceptable or legitimate
only because it is explicable as a plausible instance of rational collec-
tive action.  Reason giving thus affirms the centrality of the individual
in the democratic republic.  It treats persons as rational moral agents
who are entitled to evaluate and participate in a dialogue about offi-
cial policies on the basis of reasoned discussion.  It affirms the individ-
ual as subject rather than object of the law.
This is not to argue, of course, that the instrumental grounds for
reason giving that courts and commentators routinely provide are un-
important.  It is to suggest, instead, that there is a deeper ground for
reason giving in a democracy and therefore a reason for treating a
right to reasons as a fundamental, rather than as a contingent or deriv-
ative, human right.  Authority without reason is literally dehumaniz-
ing.  It is, therefore, fundamentally at war with the promise of
democracy, which is, after all, self-government.
This view of reason giving as an aspect of good administration is,
I think, more than an academic or philosophical quibble about the
grounds of a common practice.  Whether one views reason giving as
instrumental to other rights, or to the monitoring functions of political
and legal institutions, or as a fundamental aspect of democratic gov-
ernance, has implications for the reach and strength of the right in a
democratic legal order.
The first implication is that if reason giving, or the right to receive
reasons, is not a right parasitic on the protection of hearing rights,
legal entitlements, or the facilitation of judicial review, it is a general
one that should be demanded outside of those particular contexts.  As
I have noted, the generality of the right to reasons is already recog-
nized by the broad statements of article 253 of the EC Treaty and by
the language of § 555(e) of the APA.  The latter provides not only for
reasons in connection with general rules, but also demands “prompt
notice” of the denial in whole or part of any written application or
petition by any interested person “in connection with an agency pro-
ceeding,” including a statement of the grounds for denial.80
80 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2000).
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Yet, these broad statements cannot be taken completely at face
value.  Article 253 applies to actions of E.U. institutions that have the
force and effect of law.81  The same is true of the United States’ APA,
where reason giving is specified only for administrative hearings de-
termining individual rights or the issuance of regulations having the
effect of law.82  And, although it is sometimes given a broader applica-
tion, the requirement in APA § 555(e) for reason giving with respect
to applications, petitions, or requests applies only to the extent that
those petitions are “made in connection with any agency proceed-
ing.”83  “Agency proceeding” is a defined term in the APA which re-
fers only to agency processes of rulemaking, adjudication, and
licensing.84
These limitations have not gone unchallenged.  Justice Marshall,
for example, dissenting in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,
stated boldly, “In my view, every citizen who applies for a government
job is entitled to it unless the government can establish some reason
for denying the employment.”85  Marshall objected to the notion that
because applicants or employees without tenure had no legal “right”
to their jobs, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
had no application to their situation.86  Justice Marshall seemed to
take the position that the language “life, liberty or property” in the
Constitution was merely a placeholder for any significant human in-
terest.87  For him, the Due Process Clause was “our fundamental guar-
antee of fairness, our protection against arbitrary, capricious, and
unreasonable government action.”88  And to the argument that it
would be too burdensome to always give reasons, Marshall replied,
“The short answer to that argument is that it is not burdensome to
give reasons when reasons exist.”89
Commentators, myself included, have also objected to the Su-
preme Court’s instrumentalist conception of due process and reason
giving.  In a somewhat apoplectic vein, I wrote some years ago that
81 See EC Treaty art. 253, supra note 62, at 135 (requiring reasons for “[r]egulations, direc- 
tives and decisions adopted jointly by the European Parliament and the Council, and such acts
adopted by the Council or the Commission”).
82 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–554.
83 Id. § 555(e).
84 Id. § 551(12).
85 Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 588 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 588–89.
87 See id.
88 Id. at 589.
89 Id. at 591.
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limiting due process protections, including the right to reasons, to situ-
ations in which legal entitlements were at stake, produced both an
incoherent jurisprudence and bizarre assignments of constitutional
value to individuals’ interests.90  As I said then and believe now:
Such an approach is functionally inadequate to address the
problems of governmental or bureaucratic discretion that the
due process clause was meant to address.  [Providing hear-
ings only to protect preexisting legal entitlements] gives legal
protection, or at least due process attention, where some le-
gal protection already exists, while excluding due process
concern where a legal regime seems to permit official arbi-
trariness.  Although many have a taste for irony, few would
choose Kafka or Ionesco as constitutional draftsmen.91
The current position in the United States is particularly disadvan-
tageous for persons who are the potential beneficiaries of state regula-
tory action against others, or persons who suffer indirectly from
official actions concerning another party’s legal rights.  In general,
persons who seek the enforcement of existing regulatory provisions
against violators who are injuring their interests, or who would be
benefited by the exercise of dormant official regulatory authority,
have no right either to a hearing before the responsible officials,92 or
to judicial review of their refusal to act.93  And, so long as the require-
ment of reasoned decisionmaking is parasitic on either hearing rights
or the facilitation of judicial review, these potential beneficiaries or
indirect victims have no right to reasons either.94  “Standing” require-
ments in the United States also tend to deny judicial review to anyone
not having been directly and concretely affected by state action.95
This denial of access to judicial review, which is almost always availa-
ble to directly regulated parties, further reduces the capacity of poten-
tial beneficiaries to engage regulatory authorities in reasoned
discourse about their policies.
A similar analysis would seem to apply in E.U. law.96  To be sure,
there is broad language in some decisions suggesting that the “right to
90 Jerry L. Mashaw, Dignitary Process: A Political Psychology of Liberal Democratic Citi-
zenship, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 433, 437 (1987).
91 Id.
92 O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 775 (1980).
93 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
94 For a recent general treatment of this topic, see Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Benefi-
ciaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 403–33 (2007).
95 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
96 In particular, the requirement that individuals have both a concrete and individualized
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good administration” implies a general requirement of responsiveness
to complaints and requests that the Commission use its enforcement
power, including the requirement that the Commission’s response be
sufficient to give the court an adequate basis for judicial review.97  A
closer reading, however, suggests that these obligations are contingent
upon a finding that the particular Treaty provision under which action
is requested imposes an obligation on the Commission to take appro-
priate measures.  And although one senses a general disposition in the
European jurisprudence to take a more favorable view toward judicial
review of inaction by enforcement authorities, American courts have
also been willing to put aside standing and reviewability concerns
where particular statutes seem to impose more specific obligations on
enforcement officials.98
There may, of course, be good reasons for limiting rights to hear-
ings and rights to judicial review.  All such rights run risks of provid-
ing legal opportunity for the harassment of officials or of others over
whom those officials have some authority.  Formal hearings and judi-
cial review are also expensive and time consuming legal enterprises.
But, as Justice Marshall suggested, reason giving alone does not neces-
sarily burden administration or provide opportunities for harassment
through legal adversarialism.99  Accommodations to practical necessi-
ties can be made.  Article 18 of the ECGAB, for example, recognizes
that its broad requirement that reasons be given any time a decision
affects the “interests” of private persons may have to be modified
where individualized reason giving produces significant administrative
burdens.100  Yet, even there, article 18 demands that where large num-
bers of people are affected similarly by a decision, an official must
interest in Community decisions will often exclude beneficiaries of regulatory regimes or other
protective regimes because they will not be able to distinguish themselves from the general pub-
lic, or a broad class of beneficiaries, who are also protected.  For a recent case excluding benefi-
ciaries on grounds of standing, see Case C-321/95P, Greenpeace & Others v. Commission, 1998
E.C.R. I-1651, 1998 3 C.M.L.R. 1, discussed in Nicole Gerard, Case Note, Greenpeace & Others
v. the Commission, C-321/95P, 7 RECIEL 209, 209 (1998). See also supra note 75 and accompany- 
ing text (discussing how the ECJ has followed the Plaumann formula, refusing to broaden an
individual’s standing on matters of general application).
97 E.g., Case T-54/99, max.mobil Telekommunikation Serv. GmbH v. Comm’n, 2002
E.C.R. II-313, II-333.
98 See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 566 (1975).
99 See Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 591 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
100 See EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN, supra note 58. 
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supplement a standardized statement of reasons with a detailed expla-
nation if requested by particular individuals.101
These practicalities of legal enforcement suggest a second impli-
cation of treating reason giving as a general and fundamental right
rather than as an instrumental one.  The legal order should under-
stand this right both as a “hard law” right, sometimes enforceable in
court, and as a “soft law” right to be promoted through other means.
Courts may decline to enforce legal rights to reasons in order to main-
tain a necessary separation between judicial and administrative judg-
ment, that is, between legal constraints and administrative discretion.
Courts cannot intervene in every dispute between individuals and gov-
ernment authorities while maintaining their own legitimacy as decid-
ers.  Responsible administration, however, reaches beyond those
requirements that are judicially enforceable, and administrators can
police themselves.  Internal institutional codes of conduct and the
oversight and publicity functions of audit institutions are two devices
for internal monitoring and enforcement of the right to good adminis-
tration.  The Ombudsman in the European Union, and the depart-
mental offices of inspectors general and the Government
Accountability Office in the United States, are examples of the latter.
The European Code of Good Administrative Behavior for E.U. ad-
ministrative officials exemplifies the former.
Perhaps because of the very nature of its legal order, which is
based importantly on consensus and progressive coordination of legal
norms, the European Union may be somewhat ahead of the United
States in recognizing the importance of these “soft law” regimes.
With limited exceptions (such as the Office of the Taxpayer Advocate
in the Internal Revenue Service), the United States has never created
ombudsman offices for federal administrative agencies or depart-
ments, and the operations of the offices of inspectors general and of
the Government Accountability Office are directed more toward un-
covering corruption or systematic programmatic failure than in pro-
moting standards of good administration governing the relationship of
officials to individuals.  The European Union’s interest in pressing for-
ward the idea of “good administration,” including reason giving,
through a host of techniques that are internal to administration rather
than imposed by external legal guardians perhaps also reflects the
general historical development of European administrative law, which
101 Id.
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has never been so judicio-centric as administrative law in the United
States.
Finally, understanding reason giving by official institutions as fun-
damental to human rights in a democracy and as a part of the dynamic
project of developing democratic government, suggests that reasoned
administration should be understood both as a goal and as a right.  It
is a goal that Americans and Europeans have long shared.  The organ-
ization of state power in ways that produce a nonalienating and au-
thentic democratic dialogue has been a dream of American republican
theorists since the American Revolution.  The same objective is
deeply embedded in European social theory of the sort now most
prominently represented perhaps by the writings of Jürgen
Habermas.102  Reasoned administration is not only fundamental to our
understanding of ourselves as independent moral agents, but to the
future of the democratic project itself.
To be sure, there are many visions of democracy; not all are “dia-
logic” in their ambitions, and those that are may be too demanding for
most twenty-first century contexts.  Thomas Jefferson famously
viewed the protection of democracy as demanding that virtually all
government be conducted at an exquisitely local level.103  If Jefferson’s
localism seems quaint in a globalizing world, Jürgen Habermas’s
“ideal speech situations” may be realizable only in the virtual world of
the Internet.104  Moreover, the protection of individual moral agency
may be thought to be realized more through the “checks and bal-
ances” of Madisonian-style democratic institutions than through the
direct participation of individuals in public decisionmaking,105 and
these three possibilities hardly scratch the surface of the variations to
be found in democratic theory.106
Nevertheless, when unelected officials, whether judges or admin-
istrators, make collective decisions, visions of democracy that rely on
the will of the electorate as the legitimating claim are contextually
102 See infra note 104. 
103 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Governor John Tyler (May 26, 1810), reprinted in
The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 604–05 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden
eds., 1944); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell (Feb. 2, 1816), id. at 660–62.
104 This possibility is explored in A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward
a Critical Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 754, 796–97 (2003).
105 See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 173, 192–94 (1997).
106 For one overview among many on democratic theory, see generally IAN SHAPIRO, THE
STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (2003) (exploring democratic theory in relation to the nature
of power and domination).
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irrelevant.  We must either have some other view of democratic gov-
ernance or declare all such decisionmaking democratically illegiti-
mate.  The alternative to will-based democratic theories are theories
based on some vision of public reason.  How “rational” is understood,
through what devices it should be expressed, how demanding systems
of rational accountability should be and so on, are all deeply contesta-
ble issues of institutional design.  But this much seems clear: adminis-
tration without reason cannot meet the challenge of defending its
democratic legitimacy.
